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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : Case No. 20010915-CA 
BRAD HAMMOND, : 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the trial court's imposition of three 
consecutive sentences of zero-to-five years in the Utah State 
Prison for two counts of possession or use of a controlled 
substance and one count of possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute, all third degree felonies. This Court 
has appellate jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion either by failing 
to consider certain statutory factors or by inadequately weighing 
them prior to imposing consecutive sentences? 
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial 
court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally 
relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally 
1 
prescribed limits. st-ate v. Gihhons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 
1989)(citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has noted that 
"the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects 
the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can 
properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable 
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." State 
v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401, governing concurrent and 
consecutive sentences, provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant 
has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent 
or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
Sentences for state offenses shall run 
concurrently unless the court states in the 
sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs 
of the defendant in determining whether to 
impose consecutive sentences. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1), -401 (4) (1999) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of distributing or 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance (methamphetamine), 
a second degree felony (R. 1-2). He eventually pled guilty to 
one count of possession or use of a controlled substance, a third 
2 
degree felony (R. 12-19). At sentencing, the trial court 
considered the charge in this case as well as two other drug-
related third degree felonies to which defendant had pled in 
another case (R. 26-27, R. 49 at 2). The court then sentenced 
defendant to three consecutive terms of zero-to-five years in the 
Utah State Prison (R. 26, R. 49 at 3). Defendant filed a motion 
for review of the sentence to clarify the reasons underlying the 
consecutive sentences (R. 28-29). After a hearing on the matter, 
the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
reaffirming its decision to impose consecutive sentences (R. 33-
35 at addendum A). Defendant filed this timely appeal (R. 37). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The undisputed facts, taken in their entirety from the 
court's findings of fact, are as follows: 
1. A guilty plea of Illegal Possession or 
Use of a Controlled Substance, a third degree 
felony has been entered in case number 
0011300257 on August 27, 2001. i1] 
2. A second guilty plea of Possession with 
Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance, 
a third degree Felony has been entered in 
case number 0011300257 on August 27, 2001. 
3. A third guilty plea of Illegal Possession 
or Use of a Controlled Substance, a third 
degree felony has been entered in case number 
1
 The charges listed in the first two findings of fact 
arose from a no-knock search warrant executed on defendant's home 
on June 8, 2001 (PSR at 3). 
3 
0011300256 on August 27, 2001. [2] 
4. On October 10, 2001, the defendant 
objected to the Presentence Investigation 
Report as having errors. 
5. On October 17, 2001, the Court accepted 
Defendant's objections to the PSI and noted 
that defendant was instrumental in enabling 
his son to become involved in the drug 
culture. 
6. The Court further noted that the 
defendant has a significant drug problem and 
did not appear amenable to probation. 
7. The Court, having heard from the 
defendant and the defendant's demeanor [sic] 
concluded that the defendant should not be 
placed upon probation and the defendant was 
likely to continue violating the law and was 
a danger to the community. 
8. The recommendation of Adult Probation and 
Parole suggested that a diagnostic evaluation 
would be appropriate. 
9. Defendant refused to participate in a 
sixty day diagnostic evaluation at the Utah 
State Prison. 
(R. 34-35 at addendum A). Based on these undisputed facts, the 
court then sentenced defendant to three consecutive terms of zero 
to five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 33 at addendum A). 
The court also levied a fine of $1500 and fees of $1275 (Id.) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues either that the trial court abused its 
discretion by ordering consecutive sentences without considering 
2
 This is the charge in the current case, which arose from 
a controlled buy at defendant's home on June 4, 2 001 (PSR at 2) . 
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certain statutory factors or, alternatively, that it considered 
those factors inadequately. Defendant has not demonstrated that 
the trial court failed to consider the factors. First, the 
record reflects that the sentencing court had before it 
information addressing defendant's criminal history, and the 
court specifically acknowledged having considered it. Second, 
because defendant himself, by consciously declining a diagnostic 
evaluation, precluded the court from accessing information about 
his rehabilitative needs and appropriate sentencing alternatives, 
he cannot now complain that the court failed to consider that 
factor. Similarly, he cannot argue that his counsel's failure to 
advocate for concurrent sentences constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel where, through declining a diagnostic 
evaluation, he precluded the court from accessing the very 
information on which his counsel could conceivably have advocated 
for leniency. 
Alternatively, as to weighing the statutory factors, that is 
the job of the trial court, which was in the best position to 
make the highly individualistic assessment inherent in the 
sentencing decision. While defendant may have weighed the 
factors differently, it cannot be said that no reasonable person 
would have agreed with the sentencing court. Consequently, the 
court did not abuse its considerable discretion by imposing 
consecutive sentences. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY FAILING TO CONSIDER 
CERTAIN STATUTORY FACTORS OR BY 
IMPROPERLY WEIGHING THEM PRIOR TO 
IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES 
Defendant's argument on appeal is not clear. Either he is 
arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering 
consecutive sentences without giving adequate weight to several 
of the statutory factors specified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
401(4) (1999), or he is arguing that the court abused its 
discretion by not considering those factors at all. See Br. of 
App. at 6-7. In either case, defendant asserts that the court 
acted out of anger and ordered consecutive sentences to punish 
defendant for declining a diagnostic evaluation prior to 
sentencing (R. 6-7, 8). 
Neither of defendant's two possible arguments has merit. 
Section 76-3-401 of the Utah Code, governing the trial court's 
authority to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, directs 
the court to "consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of 
the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive 
sentences." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). A trial court may 
thus abuse its discretion if it imposes consecutive sentences 
without considering the statutory factors, which are all legally 
relevant to the sentencing determination. See, e.g., State v. 
6 
McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990); State v. Montova. 929 
P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996). To prevail on appeal, the 
defendant must affirmatively show that "the trial court failed to 
consider the appropriate factors." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, 
Kl5, 40 P.3d 626.3 
If defendant is asserting that the sentencing court did not 
consider either his history or his rehabilitative needs before 
imposing consecutive sentences, he has failed to make the 
required showing. The presentence investigation report contains 
a full criminal history as well as a personal history, including 
defendant's family situation, employment history, drug and 
alcohol history, and present living situation. See PSR at pp. 5-
9. The trial court explicitly stated that it had reviewed the 
report prior to sentencing. See Tr. of 11/13/01 at 3-5 or 
addendum B; cf. Helms, 2002 UT 12 at f 11 ("we will not assume 
that the trial court's silence, by itself, presupposes that the 
court did not consider the proper factors as required by law"); 
State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah App. 1997)(defendant 
did not show that the trial court failed to consider statutory 
3
 The sentencing court, however, is not bound to enter 
specific findings to justify its consecutive sentencing order, 
although the record must contain evidence from which such 
findings could be reasonably made. Helms, 2002 UT 12 at ff 11, 
17 (citations omitted). 
7 
factors where the record contained mitigating evidence).4 
The record demonstrates that the trial court acted within 
the ambit of its discretion in ordering consecutive sentences. 
At the clarification hearing, the court noted that defendant had 
"decided to get pretty actively involved in the drug business" 
(Id.). The court stated: 
I'll tell you, really, what my thinking was 
at the time [of sentencing]. I have had your 
son in this Court and I believe that you have 
had a corrupting influence on him and others 
around you. Your age and circumstance tell 
me you ought to have a little more maturity 
than what you were doing in the criminal 
effort here. And I thought that consecutive 
sentences were appropriate to you because of 
your circumstances and your willingness to be 
involved in crime. 
Tr. of 11/13/01 Hearing at 4. This statement reflects the 
court's serious concern with the kind of ties defendant had with 
his "community" and with his own familial influence. While 
defendant had only one other drug charge in his criminal history, 
the record indicated that he was a high risk because of his "drug 
and alcohol abuse, sporadic employment and attitude." PSR at 9. 
Moreover, his active level of involvement with "the drug 
business" was plainly attested to by his two arrests within five 
4
 Moreover, after the court had ordered consecutive 
sentences, defendant requested a hearing to clarify the sentence 
(R. 28-29). At that hearing, the court reassured defendant that 
errors in the presentence investigation report had been noted 
prior to sentencing (Tr. of 11/13/01 Hearing at 5). Thus, no 
extraneous factors influenced the sentencing decision. 
8 
days for multiple drug-related felonies. Id. at 2-3. Finally, 
defendant had been a fugitive from justice for over two months 
when he was apprehended, a factor which no doubt did little to 
enhance his standing with the court. Id. at 3. 
In addition, the court cited to defendant's refusal to 
participate in a diagnostic evaluation with the Department of 
Corrections, observing, "You said you didn't feel that would be 
beneficial and you know what your circumstances are." Tr. of 
11/13/01 Hearing at 5. Defendant's refusal to participate in a 
diagnostic evaluation significantly influenced the court's 
sentencing decision, although not for the punitive reason 
defendant suggests.5 
A diagnostic evaluation is an important tool available to a 
court when it is "of the opinion [that] imprisonment may be 
appropriate but desires more detailed information as a basis for 
determining the sentence to be imposed than has been provided by 
the presentence report." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404(1)(a)(i) 
(1999). By exercising its discretion in favor of this evaluative 
tool, the court was plainly seeking more in-depth information 
5
 Defendant contends that the sentencing court "punished" 
his refusal to participate in a diagnostic evaluation by ordering 
that his sentences run consecutively (Br. of App. at 5-6, 8). 
This contention, however, is purely speculative, both lacking in 
record support and requiring an unreasonable inferential leap. 
As such, it fails from the outset. Cf. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 
P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)("proof of ineffective assistance of 
cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable 
reality"). 
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about "the rehabilitative resources or programs . . . available 
to suit [defendant's] needs." Id. at section 76-3-
404(1) (a) (ii) (E) . Defendant's affirmative choice not to 
participate in this information-gathering process thus bars him 
from asserting on appeal that the court did not adequately 
consider his rehabilitative needs. State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991)(discussing invited error doctrine).6 
Moreover, the court was well within its discretion in considering 
defendant's obstructionist attitude as a factor in its decision 
to order consecutive sentences. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
939 (Utah 1994)(sentencing court's assessment of defendant's 
character may be based, at least in part, on the court's personal 
observation of defendant's body language, demeanor, and tone of 
voice). 
Because the record indicates that the sentencing court had 
before it information addressing defendant's history, the court 
did not abuse its discretion by failing to consider that factor. 
Helms, 2002 UT 12 at fll. And because defendant himself 
6
 For the same reason, defendant's assertion of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must fail. He cannot claim that his 
counsel performed deficiently when, by his own affirmative 
action, he precluded access to the very information on which his 
counsel might have based an argument that he merited concurrent 
sentences or that rehabilitation should rightly take precedence 
over punishment. That is, where defendant makes a strategic 
choice at trial, he is precluded from arguing on appeal that the 
result of that choice stemmed from ineffective assistance of 
counsel. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989). 
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precluded the court from accessing specific information about 
appropriate rehabilitative resources and programs, he cannot now 
complain that the court failed to consider that factor. Perdue, 
813 P.2d at 1205. 
Alternatively, if on appeal defendant is arguing that the 
trial court abused its discretion by according certain statutory 
factors insufficient weight in fashioning an appropriate 
sentence, that argument must also fail. The trial court, not an 
appellate court, is plainly in the most advantaged position to 
make the highly individualistic assessments required in 
sentencing decisions. See State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 
(Utah 1997)(sentencing "necessarily reflects the personal 
judgment of the court'') . In deciding the appropriateness of a 
particular sentence, a trial court must consider many 
intangibles, such as the defendant's "character, personality, and 
attitude, of which the cold record gives little inkling." State 
v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957); see also State v. 
McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980). Also within the 
court's discretion is the determination that punishment for the 
crime should take precedence over rehabilitation. See State v. 
Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993)("trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by placing more emphasis on punishing 
defendant rather than rehabilitating him"). Where the trial 
court here had a direct opportunity to weigh all the factors 
11 
contributing to its assessment of defendant's credibility, that 
judgment and the resultant weight accorded each of the sentencing 
factors should not be revisited by a reviewing court armed only 
with a "cold record." See, e.g., Woodland, 945 P.2d at 671; 
Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393. 
Under the circumstances of this case, while defendant did 
not agree with the court's sentence, it cannot be said that "no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial 
court." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing 
consecutive prison terms. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
consecutive sentences for three counts of possession or use of a 
controlled substance, all third degree felonies. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2^. daY o f June, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
12 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
David C. Cundick (4817) 
Deputy Tooele County Attorney 
47 South Main 
Tooele, UT 84074 
Telephone: 801-843-3120 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
PlaintifT, 
vs. ) 
BRAD HAMMOND, 
Defendant. 
1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> Case No. jfol 1300256 
On October 22,2001, this matter came on for sentencing before the Honorable David 
S. Young. The defendant was present and represented by his counsel, Doug Hogan. The State was 
represented by David C. Cundick, Deputy Tooele County Attorney. The Court, having heard from 
the respective parties and having heard from the defendant individually now makes the following, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A guilty plea of Illegal Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony 
has been entered in case number 0011300257 on August 27, 2001. 
1 
" W O DISTRICT COURT 
^djudlc/a/ Dfctrlct 
7X
*»?COUNTY 
ey-
Deputy Cleric" 
00035 
2. A second guilty plea of Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a third 
degree Felony has been entered in case number 0011300257 on August 27, 2001. 
3. A third guilty plea of Illegal Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a third degree 
felony has been entered in case number 0011300256 on August 27, 2001. 
4. On October 10, 2001, the defendant objected to the Presentence Investigation Report as 
having errors. 
5. On October 17,2001, the Court accepted Defendant's objections to the PSI and noted that 
defendant was instrumental in enabling his son to become involved in the drug culture. 
6. The Court further noted that the defendant has a significant drug problem and did not 
appear amenable to probation. 
7. The Court, having heard from the defendant and the defendant's demeanor concluded that 
the defendant should not be placed upon probation and the defendant was likely to continue violating 
the law and was a danger to the community. 
8. The recommendation of Aduh Probation and Parole suggested that a diagnostic evaluation 
would be appropriate. 
9. Defendant refused to participate in a sixty day diagnostic evaluation at the Utah State 
Prison 
2 
C 0 n 3 4 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the defendant is hereby sentenced 0-5 years at 
the Utah State Prison on each of the third degree felonies. Said convictions are to run consecutively, 
one after the other. 
Defendant is ordered to pay a fine of $500 on each of the third degree felonies for a total fine 
of $1500. 
Defendant is further ordered to pay a surcharge in the amount of $425 on each of the third 
degree felonies for a total surcharge of $1,275. 
Dated this / J ^ " day of November, 2001. 
Y THE COURT: 
David S. Yo 
Third Distric 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
L. Douglas Ho^ drfl Attorney for Defendant 
3 
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ADDENDUM B 
question, Mr. Hogan? 
MR. HOGAN: I don't, your Honor. I believe my 
client would like to address the Court. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. HOGAN: I'd—I'd just like to state that the 
purpose for the filing of this motion, your Honor, I was 
contacted by my client after—after sentencing and he wished 
some further information with regards to imposition of 
consecutive sentences;— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. HOGAN: —therefore, the motion was filed. And 
he's had a chance just now to review the—the findings, I had 
a chance to review them and I believe that he'd like to ask 
your Honor— 
THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Hammond? 
MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, I would just request that 
I possibly have my sentence be changed to concurrent. 
THE COURT: I—I decline to do that. I've already 
sentenced you. Is there anything that I didn't know then that 
you think I should know? 
MR. HAMMOND: I just—I don't know if you have 
reviewed the—the amended P.S.I, or— 
THE COURT: I had, at that time. If you're talking 
about today, is it your impression that there is a second 
amended P.S.I.? 
3 
MR. HAMMOND: Oh, no. No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. I had reviewed it at that 
time. I'll tell you, really, what my thinking was at the 
time. I have had your son in this Court and I believe that 
you have had a corrupting influence on him and others around 
you. Your age and circumstance tell me you ought to have a 
little more maturity than what you were doing in the criminal 
effort here. And I thought that consecutive sentences were 
appropriate to you because of your circumstances and your 
willingness to be involved in crime. So, that's the deal. 
MR. HAMMOND: All right. 
THE COURT: Exactly what I felt. Okay? Do you 
understand? 
MR. HAMMOND: Yeah. I just—I went for an extended 
period, you know, with no criminal conduct or no arrests, I 
don't know if any of that had been considered or— 
THE COURT: That was all considered. That was all 
part of—-I had—I had a copy, in fact, let me go to it and 
tell you what I have in terms of the P.S.I. I had the—the 
P.S.I., I had the—an updated memorandum that was dated 
October 17th, supplemented to it. I'm fully aware that—if I 
recall, it was not recommended—it was—A P & P did—did not 
necessarily recommend consecutive sentences, if my 
recollection is correct, but I did it. 
It's respectfully recommended by Adult Probation & 
4 
Parole that Mr. Hammond be referred to the custody of the 
Department of Corrections for a diagnostic. And you declined 
the diagnostic, you'll recall that. You said you didn't feel 
that would be beneficial and you know what your circumstances 
are. 
And so—and I knew that your—I knew there were 
errors in the original report, because I have written, "not 
this defendant", "not this defendant1', "not this defendant", 
on the registration violation, the reckless driving and the 
forcible sexual abuse, those were not yours; so I knew those 
were being excluded. 
And that took out a period of time from 1990 to '91 
and '96, actually, and your criminal involvement was in '79 
and '82 and '86 and then again in this present offense. 
MR. HAMMOND: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: But it was my view that you decided to 
get pretty actively involved in the drug business and that the 
circumstances of this case justified a consecutive sentence. 
You do know that the Board of Pardons has the right 
to change any of that sentence based upon your institutional 
performance. You know that? 
MR. HAMMOND: No, I didn't know that. 
THE COURT: Do you know what that means? 
MR. HAMMOND: I wasn't aware of that. 
THE COURT: Yeah. The Board of Pardons—the Board 
5 
1 of Pardons can—I mean, the Board of Pardons could determine 
2 that you can be released tomorrow, if they felt that that was 
3 justified, that's the power they have; now, I'm sure they 
4 won't do that and you know that as well as I do. But the—the 
5 Board can do that, I'm just going to initial that I opened 
6 this. And—and they have regulations which, the recent ones 
7 I'm not familiar with, but frequently, if you have no write-
8 ups in the institution in a period of one year, you can 
9 petition the Board for reconsideration of your status and—and 
10 they can make decisions about that. 
11 You have the benefit of working your way out of 
12 prison sooner than a consecutive sentence would otherwise make 
13 it. That's up to you. 
14 MR. HAMMOND: All right. 
15 THE COURT: It's up to you. 
16 MR. HAMMOND: Thank you. 
17 THE COURT: Any questions? 
18 MR. HAMMOND: Thank you for your time. 
19 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
20 MR. CUNDICK: Thank you, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: All right. You're welcome. 
22 (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
23 
24 * * * 
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